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739 
Lemons, Legislatures, and Liberties: The Constitutionality 
of Prayer at Public School Board Meetings 
I. Introduction 
While the Establishment Clause protects the people from the 
commingling of church and state,
1
 the Supreme Court has consistently 
allowed legislatures to begin sessions with an opening prayer.
2
 Generally, 
according to the bodies that practice legislative prayer, the purpose of the 
ritual is to “place [officials] in a solemn and deliberative frame of mind”
3
 
and “create a ‘more businesslike and professional decorum.’”
4
 In allowing 
such practices, the Court did not engage in its typical analysis of 
Establishment Clause claims. Instead, the Court emphasized the historical 
tradition of prayer beginning such sessions and evidence that the founders 
would have accepted such practices.
5
 The Court’s historical interpretation, 
however, has been criticized as not completely accurate.
6
  
The Sixth Circuit first considered the issue of opening prayers at public 
school board meetings in 1999.
7
 Holding opening prayers at public school 
board meetings unconstitutional,
8
 the Sixth Circuit created a precedent that 
the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit upheld, respectively, in 2011 and 
2018.
9
 The Fifth Circuit, however, departed from this precedent and 
allowed opening prayers at public school board meetings in 2017.
10
  
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Fifth Circuit case,
11
 
the right to freedom of religion is a relentless government bulwark 
deserving of preservation. When children are involved in Establishment 
Clause claims, the Court has, rightfully, been concerned about the potential 
                                                                                                             
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983); see also Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 592 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 3. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570 (majority opinion).  
 4. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 5. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792; see also Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576. 
 6. See, e.g., Chad West, Note, Legislative Prayer: Historical Tradition and 
Contemporary Issues, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 709, 711–14. 
 7. Coles, 171 F.3d at 371. 
 8. Id. at 385–86. 
 9. Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
565 U.S. 1157 (2012); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 10. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 529–30 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 470 (2018). 
 11. Id.  
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coercive nature of prayer in the school setting due to children’s 
susceptibility towards conformity.
12
 The public school board plays a 
significant role in shaping schools’ policies, procedures, and even 
disciplinary actions. Additionally, the school board embodies a public 
nature, rather than a legislative nature, in which the Supreme Court has 
allowed opening prayer. Because public school board meetings greatly 
influence schools’ policies, atmosphere, and social structure, opening 
prayers at such meetings are unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause.  
This Comment discusses the constitutionality, under the Establishment 
Clause and Supreme Court precedent, of opening prayer at public school 
board meetings. Part II analyzes the tests that courts utilize to determine if a 
law or practice violates the Establishment Clause, including the Supreme 
Court’s standard rejection of religion and prayer in the public school 
setting.
13
 Part III analyzes the recent circuit split regarding opening prayer 
in public school board meetings.
14
 Part IV of this Comment recommends a 
constitutional approach for future courts confronted with prayer in the 
public school board setting and similar situations.
15
 Public school boards 
should begin sessions with a moment of silence, allowing each individual to 
use that time as he or she so chooses. Finally, Part V concludes by 




II. Establishment Clause ‘Tests’ 
The Establishment Clause protects the people against “three main 
evils”
17
 regarding religion and government: “sponsorship, financial support, 
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”
18
 When 
confronted with an Establishment Clause claim, the Supreme Court has 
applied numerous—and often paradoxical—tests.  
  
                                                                                                             
 12. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“Research in psychology 
supports the common assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from 
their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social 
convention.”).  
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part V.  
 17. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).  
 18. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
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A. Traditional Analysis: The Lemon Test 
In 1971, the Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged approach to 
determine whether a challenged law or practice violates the Establishment 
Clause.
19
 Moving forward, the Supreme Court itself utilized this analysis in 
Establishment Clause claims.
20
 The three prongs require the statute to “have 
a secular legislative purpose,” have a “principal or primary effect . . . that 
neither advances nor inhibits religions,” and avoid “foster[ing] ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”
21
 If the statute violates 
one prong, the law is unconstitutional.
22
  
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court considered two similar state statutes 
that provided aid to nonpublic schools.
23
 While explicitly prohibiting the 
use of state-provided funds for religious purposes, the statutes primarily 
funded Roman Catholic schools.
24
 Additionally, both statutes allowed state-
provided funds to supplement nonpublic schoolteachers’ salaries.
25
  
The Court found excessive entanglement, violating the third prong, due 
to the “cumulative impact of the entire relationship . . . between 
government and religion.”
26
 Specifically, the Court was concerned with 
states funding nonpublic school teachers’ salaries because even “[w]ith the 
best of intentions such a teacher would find it hard to make a total 
separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine.”
27
 Moreover, 
one statute enabled the state to perform a post-audit of the nonpublic 
school’s financial records to ensure that only secular programs were state 
funded, which the Court found “creates an intimate and continuing 
relationship between church and state.”
28
  
While the majority opinion did not allude to any heightened concern of 
Establishment Clause claims in relation to children, Justice Douglas, in his 
concurring opinion, highlighted it as a key issue.
29
 Justice Douglas noted 
that a primary disadvantage of the public school system “is that a state 
system may attempt to mold all students alike according to the views of the 
                                                                                                             
 19. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
 20. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984). 
 21. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citations omitted).  
 22. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980). 
 23. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606. 
 24. Id. at 608–10. 
 25. Id. at 607, 609. 
 26. Id. at 614. 
 27. Id. at 618–19. 
 28. Id. at 621–22. 
 29. Id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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B. The ‘Legislative Prayer Exception:’ The Marsh-Greece Test 
After articulating the Lemon three-pronged analysis, the Supreme Court 
consistently applied the analysis to a multitude of Establishment Clause 
claims.
31
 In applying the analysis in various cases, the Court held various 
challenged practices as violating the Establishment Clause,
32
 and the Court 
also held other practices as constitutional.
33
 In practice, the Lemon test 
requires a case-by-case analysis. When presented with a claim challenging 
a legislative-prayer practice, the Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon 
analysis.
34
 On review of the Eighth Circuit’s decision, however, the 
Supreme Court created a different analysis altogether for legislative-prayer 
claims just twelve years after its articulation of the Lemon analysis.
35
 
1. Marsh v. Chambers 
In 1983, the Supreme Court considered whether a state legislature’s 
practice of beginning sessions with an opening prayer violates the 
Establishment Clause.
36
 While the Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon test 
and found the practice violated all three prongs,
37
 the Supreme Court 
reversed and, significantly, did not apply the Lemon analysis.
38
  
Instead, the Court’s analysis focused on “the unambiguous and unbroken 
history” of beginning legislative sessions with prayer.
39
 “The opening of 
sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer,” the 
majority argued, “is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this 
country.”
40
 Specifically, the Court noted that both the Continental Congress 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (applying the Lemon 
analysis after Marsh); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) (applying the 
Lemon analysis prior to Marsh).  
 32. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779–
80 (1973); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123, 126 (1982). 
 33. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736 (1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 
388, 404 (1983). 
 34. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234–35 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 783 
(1983). 
 35. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–91 (1983). 
 36. Id. at 784. 
 37. Chambers, 675 F.2d at 234–35. 
 38. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786–91. 
 39. Id. at 792. 
 40. Id. at 786. 
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and the First Congress engaged in such practices.
41
 The Constitutional 
Convention, however, did not begin with a prayer, though Chief Justice 
Burger averred that “this may simply have been an oversight.”
42
  
Based on these historical instances of legislative prayer, the Court 
concluded that “[c]learly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a 
violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with 
prayer has continued without interruption ever since that early session of 
Congress.”
43
 The Court focused on this historical evidence regarding the 
founders’ practices because it “sheds light not only on what the draftsmen 
intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought 
that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress—their 
actions reveal their intent.”
44
 Additionally, the Court interpreted evidence of 
the founders’ debates regarding the constitutionality of legislative prayer as 
“demonstrating that the subject was considered carefully and the action not 
taken thoughtlessly, by force of long tradition and without regard to the 
problems posed by a pluralistic society.”
45
  
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 
200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of 
our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body 
entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 
“establishment” of religion or a step toward establishment; it is 
simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held 
among the people of this country.
46
 
Therefore, the Court held that the state legislature may continue its practice 
of beginning sessions with an opening prayer because it is not an 




In an impassioned dissent, Justice William J. Brennan criticized the 
majority for “carving out an exception to the Establishment Clause” instead 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. at 787–88.  
 42. Id. at 787 n.6. 
 43. Id. at 788. 
 44. Id. at 790. 
 45. Id. at 791. 
 46. Id. at 792. 
 47. Id. 
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of adhering to established precedent, namely the Lemon test.
48
 Justice 
Brennan had “no doubt that, if any group of law students were asked to 
apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they 
would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”
49
  
Justice Brennan found the majority’s reasoning unpersuasive for three 
key reasons.
50
 First, it was “self-evident” to Justice Brennan “[t]hat the 
‘purpose’ of legislative prayer is pre-eminently religious rather than 
secular.”
51
 Any secular purpose that such a practice might afford, like 
“formally opening the legislative session, getting the members of the body 
to quiet down, and imbuing them with a sense of seriousness and high 
purpose,” could be accomplished without any connection to prayer or 
religion.
52
 Second, “[t]he ‘primary effect’ of legislative prayer is also 
clearly religious” because it “explicitly link[s] religious belief and 
observance to the power and prestige of the State.”
53
 Third, legislative 
prayer necessarily entails “excessive entanglement” between government 
and religion.
54
 Specifically, the method of selecting a “‘suitable’ chaplain” 
entangles government and religion.
55
 
Justice Brennan also discussed the implicit principles of “separation 
[and] neutrality” in the Establishment Clause.
56
 One purpose of these 
principles is “to guarantee the individual right to conscience,”
57
 which is 
“implicated when the government engages in direct or indirect coercion”
58
 
and “when the government requires individuals to support the practices of a 
faith with which they do not agree.”
59
 Second, the First Amendment’s 
adherence to separation and neutrality ensures that the state does not 
“interfer[e] in the essential autonomy of religious life.”
60
 Additionally, 
these principals “prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by 
too close an attachment to the organs of government.”
61
 Finally, separation 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 800–01. 
 50. Id. at 796–801.  
 51. Id. at 797. 
 52. Id. at 797–98. 
 53. Id. at 798. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 799. 
 56. Id. at 803. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 804. 
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and neutrality ensure that religious debates do not infiltrate the political 
sphere so citizens do not “feel alienated from [their] government because 
that government has declared or acted upon some ‘official’ or ‘authorized’ 
point of view on a matter of religion.”
62
  
Moreover, the dissent rebutted the majority’s interpretation of the 
“unbroken practice” of legislative prayer in the United States.
63
 Justice 
Brennan noted that the founders did not include a reference to “God” in the 
Constitution, which significantly differed from the Articles of 
Confederation and many state constitutions following the revolution.
64
 
Additionally, the dissent referenced James Madison questioning the early 
Congresses’ beginning sessions with an opening prayer: “Is the 
appointment of Chaplains to the two Houses of Congress consistent with 
the Constitution, and with the pure principle of religious freedom?”
65
 The 
dissent continued by criticizing the belief that the founders should be 
viewed as “sacred figures whose every actions must be emulated,” rather 
than “the authors of a document meant to last for the ages.”
66
 
Justice Brennan recognized “that not every governmental act which 
coincides with or conflicts with a particular religious belief is for that 
reason an establishment of religion.”
67
 Yet, that reasoning does not justify 
legislative prayer because “prayer is fundamentally and necessarily 
religious.”
68
 Therefore, the dissent urged the abolishment of legislative 




2. Town of Greece v. Galloway 
In 2014, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Marsh and expanded it to allow 
legislative prayer in town board meetings.
70
 Since 1999, the town board 
began its public meetings with an opening prayer delivered by a local 
clergyman,
71
 who “compose[d] their own devotions” without approval or 
guidance by the board.
72
 Similar to the majority’s reasoning in Marsh, the 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id. at 805–06. 
 63. Id. at 806–08. 
 64. Id. at 807. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 817. 
 67. Id. at 810. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 812. 
 70. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 571. 
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town argued that the opening prayer served several nonreligious functions, 
including creating a solemn environment and honoring tradition, and 
“follow[ed] a tradition practiced by Congress.”
73
  
In analyzing the town board’s practice, the Court cautioned against 
interpreting Marsh “as permitting a practice that would amount to a 
constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation.”
74
 Instead, Marsh 
demonstrates “that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by 
reference to historical practices and understandings.’”
75
 The proper inquiry 
in legislative-prayer claims is “to determine whether the [challenged] 




The Court emphasized that “Marsh nowhere suggested that the 
constitutionality of legislative prayer turns on the neutrality of its 
content.”
77
 Therefore, the Court rejected the argument that legislative 
prayer must be nonsectarian because such a requirement “would force the 
legislatures that sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to decide 
these cases to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech.”
78
 Any 
restraints on legislative prayer come instead from “its place at the opening 
of legislative sessions, where it is meant to lend gravity on the occasion and 
reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage.”
79
  
The Court noted that the “principal audience” of the legislative prayer 
challenged in Town of Greece was not the public but the town board 
members.
80
 Unconstitutional coercion does not occur in legislative bodies 
simply because the body “expos[es] constituents to prayer they would 
rather not hear and in which they need not participate.”
81
 The Court 
explained, however, that “[t]he analysis would be different if town board 
members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled out 
dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions might be 
influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”
82
 Yet, the 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. at 570. 
 74. Id. at 576. 
 75. Id. (citation omitted). 
 76. Id. at 577. 
 77. Id. at 580. 
 78. Id. at 581. 
 79. Id. at 582–83. 
 80. Id. at 587 (“The principal audience for these invocations is not, indeed, the public 
but lawmakers themselves, who may find that a moment of prayer of quiet reflection sets the 
mind to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of governing.”). 
 81. Id. at 590. 
 82. Id. at 588. 
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Court cautioned that “[a]bsent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, 
proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge 




The dissenting opinions in Town of Greece did not call into question the 
underlying premise of Marsh—that legislative prayer is constitutional based 
on its historical tradition—but, rather, objected to the specific form of 
legislative prayer at the town board.
84
 In her dissenting opinion, Justice 
Elena Kagan argued that the town board’s practice was unconstitutional 
because the “meetings involve participating by ordinary citizens, and the 
invocations given—directly to those citizens—were predominately 
sectarian in content”
85




According to Justice Kagan, when governments offer primarily sectarian 
prayers that reference a single religion, the “public proceeding becomes 
(whether intentionally or not) an instrument for dividing [a minority citizen] 
from adherents to the community’s majority religion, and for altering the 
very nature of her relationship with her government.”
87
 The U.S. 
Constitution guarantees that a citizen’s “religious beliefs” do not affect 
one’s ability “to perform a service or request a benefit” from the 
government.
88
 Therefore, exclusively sectarian prayers that refer 
exclusively to the majority religion have no place in governmental 
proceedings because they can alienate minority citizens.
89
  
Additionally, Justice Kagan rebutted the majority’s assertion that 
requiring legislative prayers to be nonsectarian would necessitate 
government sponsorship of religion.
90
 “If the Town Board had let its 
chaplains know that they should speak in nonsectarian terms, common to 
diverse religious groups, then no one would have valid grounds for 
complaint.”
91
 Alternatively, the town board could have “invited clergy of 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. at 585. 
 84. See id. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the Second Circuit “did not 
believe that the Constitution forbids legislative prayers that incorporate content associated 
with a particular denomination”); id. at 616 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court’s 
decision in Marsh v. Chambers.” (citation omitted)).  
 85. Id. at 616 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 621.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 632. 
 91. Id. 
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In conclusion, the Town of Greece Court reaffirmed the holding of 
Marsh and extended its application to town board meetings.
93
 Lower courts 
are instructed to consider whether the challenged practice conforms with 
the historical tradition of prayer at such public bodies.
94
 
3. Lower Courts’ Applications of the Marsh-Greece Test 
Following the Supreme Court’s clarification of Marsh in Town of 
Greece, claims regarding prayer practices in meetings of counties’ boards 
of commissioners reached the Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit.
95
 
Interestingly, while the two circuits agreed that the Marsh-Greece 
framework was the correct analysis for such issues,
96




a) Lund v. Rowan County 
The Fourth Circuit found that the challenged practice violated the 
Establishment Clause under the Marsh-Greece analysis.
98
 In Lund, the 
board of commissioners began their bi-monthly meetings with an opening 
prayer.
99
 “No one outside the Board is permitted to offer [such] an 
invocation.”
100
 Moreover, the prayers, both “composed and delivered” by a 
commissioner,
101




When presented with “whether Rowan County’s practice of lawmaker-
led sectarian prayer runs afoul of the Establishment Clause,”
103
 the Fourth 
Circuit applied the Marsh-Greece framework and emphasized the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. at 570 (majority opinion).  
 94. Id. at 577. 
 95. See Lund v. Rowan Cnty., 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Bormuth v. Cnty. 
of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 96. Lund, 863 F.3d at 276; Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509. 
 97. Compare Lund, 863 F.3d at 290 (holding that the practice violated the 
Establishment Clause under the Marsh-Greece analysis), with Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 514–15 
(holding that the practice did not violate the Establishment Clause under the Marsh-Greece 
analysis). 
 98. Lund, 863 F.3d at 290.  
 99. Id. at 272. 
 100. Id. at 273. 
 101. Id. at 272. 
 102. Id. at 273. 
 103. Id. at 271–72. 
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Court’s iteration of the purposes of legislative prayer.
104
 The Fourth Circuit 
recognized that the Supreme Court “acknowledged that it has not ‘define[d] 
the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause.’”
105
 Additionally, the 




 In applying the Marsh-Greece analysis, the Fourth Circuit considered 
the board’s prayer practice “from the perspective of the ‘reasonable 
observer,’ who is presumed to be ‘acquainted with [the] tradition’ of 
legislative prayer.”
107
 Due to the unique circumstances of this legislator-led 
prayer,
108
 which consisted nearly exclusively of Christian doctrine
109
 and 
often “served to advance that faith,”
110
 the Fourth Circuit concluded that the 
prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause under the Marsh-Greece 
framework.
111
 The prayer practice was “exploited to proselytize or advance 
[a particular faith] or to disparage any other.”
112
  
The Fourth Circuit contrasted the present facts from those in Marsh and 
Town of Greece. The Fourth Circuit distinguished the identity of the prayer-
givers—in Marsh and Town of Greece, the state invited the prayer-giver; 
“[b]ut in Rowan County, the prayer-giver was the state itself.”
113
 
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit noted that the ability to lead prayer in this 
case “was exclusively reserved for the commissioners,” while the prayer 




In considering the legislator-led prayer, the Fourth Circuit was careful to 
emphasize that it “is not inherently unconstitutional.”
115
 Weighing the 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. at 275–76 (“[A] moment of prayer or quiet reflection sets the mind[s] [of 
legislators] to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of governing.” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 587 (2014)). 
 105. Id. at 276 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 283–84 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587). 
 108. Id. at 277. 
 109. Id. at 273 (“97% of the Board’s prayers mentioned ‘Jesus,’ ‘Christ,’ or the 
‘Savior.’”). 
 110. Id. at 284–85 (“By portraying the failure to love Jesus or follow his teachings as 
spiritual defects, the prayers implicitly ‘signal[ed] the disfavor toward’ non-Christians.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 589)). 
 111. Id. at 275. 
 112. Id. at 276 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983)) (alterations in 
original). 
 113. Id. at 281. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 280. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
750 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:739 
 
 
empirical evidence regarding legislator-led prayer, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that “while lawmakers may occasionally lead an invocation, this 
phenomenon appears to be the exception to the rule, at least at the state and 
federal levels.”
116
 In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit considered 




Additionally, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the real “risk of political 
division stemming from prayer practice conflict.”
118
 For example, after an 
individual who objected to the board’s prayer practice was “booed and 
jeered by the audience,”
119
 the prayer practice became a campaign issue in 
the subsequent board elections.
120
 These threats to democracy, according to 
both the Supreme Court in Lemon and the Fourth Circuit, are perils that 
“the First Amendment was intended to protect” against.
121
 
b) Bormuth v. County of Jackson 
Following the Town of Greece decision, the Sixth Circuit was confronted 
with a claim regarding opening prayer in monthly public meetings of a 
county board of commissioners.
122
 In Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit applied the 
Marsh-Greece framework in its analysis of the board’s practice.
123
 While 
recognizing that its holding “conflict[s] with the Fourth Circuit’s recent en 
banc decision,” the Sixth Circuit ultimately found the Fourth Circuit’s 
opinion and reasoning “unpersuasive.”
124
  
The Sixth Circuit applied Marsh-Greece by “follow[ing] the Supreme 
Court’s precedent and conclud[ing] Lemon’s endorsement test is 
inapplicable to legislative prayer cases.”
125
 Previously, the Sixth Circuit 
refused to apply the Marsh-Greece framework to a public school board’s 
practice of beginning meetings with an opening prayer.
126
 In Bormuth, 
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. at 279. 
 117. Id. at 280. 
 118. Id. at 282. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)). 
 122. Bormuth v. Cnty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 123. Id. at 509 (“[T]he prayer practice [in Jackson Country] fits within the tradition long 
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.” (alteration in original) (quoting Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014)). 
 124. Id. at 509 n.5. 
 125. Id. at 515. 
 126. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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however, the Sixth Circuit declined to reconsider prayer in public school 
board meetings “[b]ecause the issue is not [now] before us.”
127
 
In Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that the board’s 
“prayer practice falls outside our historically accepted traditions because 
the Commissioners themselves, not chaplains, or invited community 
members, lead the invocations.”
128
 In so holding, the Sixth Circuit 
emphasized that the Supreme Court never restricted “who may give 
prayers” in either Marsh or Town of Greece.
129
 Additionally, the court’s 
analysis relied on the “long-standing tradition” of legislator-led prayer, 
which amicus briefs of various states sought to establish.
130
 “Amici’s 
helpful identification of the historical breadth of legislator-led prayer in the 
state capitals for over one hundred fifty years more than confirms to us that 
our history embraces prayers by legislators as part of the ‘benign 
acknowledgement of religion’s role in society.’”
131
  
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit considered the strange results that could 
occur if a constitutional distinction was made regarding who led prayer: “an 
invocation delivered in one county by a guest minister would be upheld, 
while the identical invocation delivered in another county by one of the 
legislators would be struck down.”
132
 The Sixth Circuit also rejected the 
argument that the board’s practice violated the Establishment Clause 
because “the prayers offered before the Board generally espouse the 
Christian faith.”
133
 Again relying on Marsh and Town of Greece, the court 




C. Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test 
Another test was articulated in the 1980s by Justice O’Connor in a 
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.
135
 The endorsement test 
                                                                                                             
 127. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 505 n.4. 
 128. Id. at 509. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 509–10. 
 131. Id. at 510 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)). 
 132. Id. at 512. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 513 (stating that the Supreme Court, in Town of Greece, clarified that Marsh 
“did not ‘imply the rule that prayer violates the Establishment Clause any time it is given in 
the name of a figure deified by only one faith or creed’” (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 
at 580–81)). 
 135. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
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“clarifies” the excessive entanglement prong.
136
 Justice O’Connor began 
her opinion by recognizing that “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits 
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a 
person’s standing in the political community.”
137
  
While acknowledging excessive entanglement as a way governments can 
violate the Establishment Clause, Justice O’Connor was primarily 
concerned with “government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”
138
 
Endorsement, according to Justice O’Conner, is a “more direct 
infringement” than entanglement because it “sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not fully members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 




Rejecting the argument that political divisiveness caused by government 
action violates the Lemon excessive entanglement prong,
140
 Justice 
O’Connor clarified that “[t]he entanglement prong of the Lemon test is 
properly limited to institutional entanglement.”
141
 While the existence of 
political divisiveness “may be evidence” of an Establishment Clause 
violation, “the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the 
character of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not 
on the divisiveness itself.”
142
  
D. Prayer in the Public School Setting  
The Supreme Court is hesitant to allow religious practices in the public 
school setting.
143
 Generally, the Court forbids government sponsorship of 
religion in public schools due to children’s impressionable nature, 
children’s susceptibility to peer pressure, and the mandatory attendance 
requirement.
144
 The Court has also characterized prayer in public schools as 
an “indirect coercion” risk.
145
 The Justices are generally more hesitant 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 687 (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. at 687–88. 
 139. Id. at 688. 
 140. Id. at 689 (“In my view, political divisiveness along religious lines should not be an 
independent test of constitutionality.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding unconstitutional a 
public school’s practice of beginning each day with a prayer). 
 144. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987). 
 145. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).  
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1. Prayer at the Beginning of Public School Days 
In 1962, the Supreme Court considered whether a school district’s 
practice of beginning each day with an opening prayer violates the 
Establishment Clause.
147
 The prayer, which state officials wrote, read, 
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg 
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country.”
148
 The 
Court held the practice as “wholly inconsistent with the Establishment 
Clause” because the same “establish[es] an official religion,” regardless of 
whether it “directly . . . coerce[d] nonobserving individuals or not.”
149
 
Additionally, the Court maintained that “[i]t is neither sacrilegious nor 
antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should 
stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave 
that purely religious function to the people.”
150
 Holding that an opening 
prayer to begin the public school day violates the Establishment Clause, the 
Court would continue to strike down similar practices,
151




2. Prayer at Public School Graduations 
In 1992, the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman held a school district’s 
practice of including prayer in middle school and high school graduations 
unconstitutional as violating the Establishment Clause.
153
 The Court 
focused on the coercive atmosphere of school compared to the atmosphere 
of a legislative session.
154
  
The atmosphere at the opening session of a state legislature 
where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and 
for any number of reasons cannot compare with the constraining 
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. (“As we have observed before, there are heightened concerns with protecting 
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public 
schools.”). 
 147. Engel, 370 U.S. at 423. 
 148. Id. at 422. 
 149. Id. at 424, 430. 
 150. Id. at 435. 
 151. Id. at 424. 
 152. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 596–97. 
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potential of the one school event most important for the student 
to attend. The influence and force of a formal exercise in a 




The Court was concerned with protecting students from “subtle coercive 
pressure” in public schools.
156
 Additionally, the Court referred to 
psychology studies which maintain that children generally are vulnerable to 
peer pressure, and such is “strongest in matters of social convention.”
157
 
Moreover, the Court highlighted the extreme political divisiveness of 
undisguised religious exercises in public school, where students have “no 
real alternative . . . to avoid the fact or appearance of participation.”
158
 
Finally, the Court recognized that the founding fathers believed that the 




Lee articulates that the Court is hesitant to allow any form of religion, 
including prayers, in the public school setting. Due to the reality of peer 
pressure in adolescents, the coercive nature of the school setting, and the 
Constitution’s protection of individuals’ freedom of religion, the Court has 
consistently declared unconstitutional the use of prayer in public schools.  
3. Prayer at Public School Extracurricular Activities 
In 2000, the Supreme Court considered whether its disapproval of prayer 
in public schools extended to voluntary school-sponsored events, 
specifically student-led and student-initiated prayers before high school 
football games.
160




Considering the prayer practice at the football games, the Court’s 
analysis was “guided by the principles that we endorsed in Lee.”
162
 In 
holding that “an objective Santa Fe High School student will 
unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her 
school’s seal of approval,” the Court applied Justice O’Connor’s so-called 
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. at 597. 
 156. Id. at 592. 
 157. Id. at 593. 
 158. Id. at 588. 
 159. Id. at 591. 
 160. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). 
 161. Id. at 296–97, 298 n.6. 
 162. Id. at 302. 
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 “In cases involving state participation in a religious 
activity, one of the relevant questions is ‘whether an objective observer, 
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the 




While the school district argued that attendance at the events was 
voluntary, the Court noted that attendance was essentially mandatory for 
many students, such as the players, the cheerleaders, and the band 
members.
165
 More strikingly, however, the Court explained that it would 
still find the pregame prayer to be coercive even assuming all students’ 
attendance to be completely voluntary.
166
 “Even if we regard every high 
school student’s decision to attend a home football game as purely 
voluntary, we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame 
prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an 
act of religious worship.”
167
 
Regarding the school district’s election system for choosing the student 
who would lead the prayer, the Court was concerned “that minority 
candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively 
silenced.”
168
 Concerning the school district’s entanglement with religion, 
the Court again referenced Lee: “In this case, as we found in Lee, the 
‘degree of school involvement’ makes it clear that the pregame players bear 
‘the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in 
an untenable position.’”
169
 Specifically, the Court was concerned with the 
school district’s policy behind the prayer “to solemnize the event,” which, 
“by its terms, invites and encourages religious messages.”
170
 Additionally, 
the Court was cognizant of the environment in which these prayers were 
presented: “Once the student speaker is selected and the message 
composed, the invocation is then delivered to a large audience assembled as 




                                                                                                             
 163. Id. at 308. 
 164. Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 165. Id. at 292. 
 166. Id. at 312. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 304. 
 169. Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)). 
 170. Id. at 306. 
 171. Id. at 307. 
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The Court, although ultimately striking down this practice as 
unconstitutional, articulated a reoccurring tension in Establishment Clause 
cases between “the sincere desire to include public prayer as a part of 
various occasions so as to mark those occasions’ significance” and the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of separation of church and state.
172
 
III. Prayer in Public School Board Meetings 
Recently, the specific issue of opening prayer in public school board 
meetings has circulated the lower courts. The majority of courts addressing 
the issue have applied the Lemon analysis and concluded such practices are 
unconstitutional.
173
 In 2017, however, the Fifth Circuit analogized school 
boards to legislatures and instead applied the Marsh-Greece framework, 
finding the practice of opening prayers constitutional.
174
 
A. The Majority View 
In applying the Lemon test to public school boards’ prayer practices, the 
majority of circuits focused on the inherent differences between a public 
school board and a legislative session.
175
 The circuits articulated a 
reoccurring difference between the two: students were generally present at 
the board meetings, both voluntarily and involuntarily.
176
 These circuits 




1. Sixth Circuit: Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Board of Education 
In Cleveland, Ohio, the public school board is responsible for a variety 
of school policies, including “the school system’s curriculum, dress code, 
searches of student lockers, disciplinary rules, expulsion and suspension 
procedures, and the promotion of ‘ethical principles and democratic ideals’ 
                                                                                                             
 172. Id. 
 173. See, e.g., Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 383, 385 (6th 
Cir. 1999); Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 1157 (2012); Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 174. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526, 529–30 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 470 (2018). 
 175. See, e.g., Coles, 171 F.3d at 382–83. 
 176. Id. at 381–82; see also Indian River, 653 F.3d at 281; Chino Valley, 896 F.3d at 
1145–46. 
 177. Coles, 171 F.3d at 381. 
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 Approximately twice per month, the school board holds 
meetings on school property that are opened to the public, including both 
adults and students, who can discuss issues and concerns with the board.
179
 
Additionally, “a student representative regularly sits on the school board 
itself,” and the board regularly invites students of all ages in recognition of 
the students’ various achievements.
180
 
Although the school board held meetings without prayer prior to 1992,
181
 
the newly elected board president established the practice of beginning the 
meetings with an opening prayer to promote a “more businesslike and 
professional decorum.”
182
 That same year, a high school student was invited 
to a board meeting to receive an award.
183
 The high school student was 
“shocked and surprised” by the opening prayer and “questioned whether 
she would attend another school board meeting if the practice continued.”
184
 
Additionally, a high school teacher consistently questioned the 
constitutionality of the board’s practice of opening prayer, but he continued 
attending the meetings so to address various issues with the board.
185
 Since 
he had to arrive early to secure a seat, the teacher could not wait outside of 
the meeting until the conclusion of the prayer in order to join afterward.
186
 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that “the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that school-sponsored religious activity 
transgresses the Establishment Clause.”
187
 The Sixth Circuit then 
acknowledged the Marsh decision, which, at the time, was “the only case in 
which the Court has dealt with government-sponsored prayer outside the 
context of the public schools.”
188
 The court framed the issue as “whether 
the school board’s practice falls within the mainstream of school prayer 
cases, as did the graduation speaker in Lee, or instead is controlled by 
Marsh, a historical exception to the mainstream.”
189
 In determining which 
analysis to apply to public school board meetings, the Sixth Circuit noted 
                                                                                                             
 178. Id. at 372 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.602 (West, Westlaw through 133d 
Gen. Assemb.)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 373. 
 183. Id. at 374. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 376. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 377. 
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that “the school board is an integral part of the public school system.”
190
 
The Sixth Circuit interpreted a “dual basis” underlying the Supreme Court’s 
decisions regarding public schools and religion: “One is the fact that 
students are young, impressionable, and compelled to attend public school, 
and the other is that public schools are particularly important to the 
maintenance of a democratic, pluralistic society.”
191
  
Significantly, the Sixth Circuit refused to adopt the district court’s 
reliance on a particular phrase in Marsh—“other deliberative public 
bodies”—as reason to apply the Marsh analysis to additional scenarios 
other than legislative bodies.
192
 The Sixth Circuit relied on the fact that 
“[t]he Supreme Court did not define the term, and has never discussed its 
scope.”
193
 Instead of applying the Marsh framework to the board, the Sixth 
Circuit held “that the school board, unlike other public bodies, is an integral 
part of the public school system.”
194
 
In applying the traditional analysis of prayer in public schools, the Sixth 
Circuit was concerned with the fact that the board meetings were held on 
school property and were “attended by students who actively and regularly 
participate in the discussions of school-related matters.”
195
 Because of the 
board’s unique relationship to the school itself, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that public school boards are different than legislative bodies.
196
  
Under the Lemon analysis, the court held the board’s practice of 
beginning meetings with an opening prayer as unconstitutional.
197
 While 
the board’s stated purpose of the prayers was to furnish the meetings with 
“a more professional decorum,”
198
 the board president publicly endorsed 
Christianity in his explanation of the prayer’s purpose.
199
 The court 
regarded these conflicting purposes as particularly concerning under the 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. at 376. 
 191. Id. at 377. 
 192. Id. at 380–81. 
 193. Id. at 381. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. (“[T]he fact that the function of the school board is uniquely directed toward 
school-related matters gives it a different type of ‘constituency’ than those of other 
legislative bodies—namely, students.”). 
 197. Id. at 385. 
 198. Id. at 384. 
 199. Id. (referring to the board president’s statements “that the prayers were an 
acknowledgement of ‘Christians who participate in the schools’ and that ‘I feel that the 
moment you kick prayer out of the school, the Lord walks out of the school’”). 
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 Additionally, the court was concerned with the 
content of the prayers, which frequently referenced the Bible and Jesus.
201
 
“The board could have used the inspirational words of Abraham Lincoln or, 
as in fact one speaker did, the speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to 
achieve the same ends. Instead, the board relied upon the intrinsically 
religious practice of prayer to achieve its stated secular end.”
202
 
Under the second prong of the Lemon analysis, which considers the 
primary effect of the practice, the Sixth Circuit found that the opening 
prayer practice had “the primary effect of endorsing religion.”
203
 Because 
the prayers frequently referenced a specific religion in a setting where 
schoolchildren were regularly present, the court found that “any reasonable 
observer would conclude that the school board was endorsing 
Christianity.”
204
 Regarding the third prong of entanglement, the court found 
nearly identical entanglement as that in Lee.
205
 Over a decade later, the 
Third Circuit also held a public school board’s practice of beginning 




2. Third Circuit: Doe v. Indian River School District 
In Indian River, Delaware, the public school board is tasked with 
multiple responsibilities involving the schools so that the board is involved 
in “nearly all aspects of a student’s life.”
207
 The board’s extensive duties 
include determining the public schools’ hours, holidays, and educational 
policies.
208
 Regarding the audience of the board meetings, “at least some 
students attend nearly all of the meetings held during the school year.”
209
 
For example, a student may attend board meetings to speak with the board 
when he or she has committed a serious offense requiring disciplinary 
                                                                                                             
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 385. 
 205. Id. (“The school board decided to include prayer in its public meetings, chose which 
member from the local religious community would give those prayers, and has more recently 
had the school board president himself compose and deliver prayers to those in the 
audience.”). 
 206. Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 290 (3d Circ. 2011), cert. denied, 565 
U.S. 1157 (2012). 
 207. Id. at 263. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 264. 
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actions, and students are invited to the public comments section, where they 
can discuss any matter with the board.
210
  
Since the district was formed in 1969, the school board has begun its 
monthly board meetings, held on school property, with an opening 
prayer.
211
 The prayer practice, however, was not formalized until 2004 
following a “heated community debate” surrounding the practice.
212
 
According to the board’s policy, the purpose of the opening prayer is “to 
solemnify its proceedings.”
213
 The Third Circuit, however, noted that “the 
record shows that the prayers recited at the meetings nearly always—and 
exclusively—refer to Christian concepts.”
214
 The policy also states that the 




The Third Circuit applied Lee to the school board’s prayer policy 
because “Lee and the Supreme Court’s other school prayer cases reveal that 
the need to protect students from government coercion in the form of 
endorsed or sponsored religion is at the heart of the school prayer cases.”
216
 
The court emphasized this decision was due in part to the fact that “students 
are particularly vulnerable to peer pressure in social context.”
217
 Critically, 
the court “conclude[d] that Marsh is ill-suited to [the public school board] 
context because the entire purpose and structure of the Indian River School 
Board revolves around public school education.”
218
 
Applying Lemon, the Third Circuit found that the prayer practice violates 
the second prong because its “primary effect . . . is to promote 
Christianity.”
219
 Additionally, the court highlighted that “[p]rayer in school 
and at school events has been a contentious issue in the Indian River School 
District for some time.”
220
 Regarding the excessive entanglement prong, the 
court found that the prayer practice bears multiple “hallmarks of state 
involvement.”
221
 Specifically, the school board, “in official meetings that 
are completely controlled by the state,” “composes and recites the prayer” 
                                                                                                             
 210. Id. at 264–65. 
 211. Id. at 261, 263. 
 212. Id. at 261. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 265. 
 215. Id. at 261. 
 216. See id. at 275. 
 217. Id. at 277. 
 218. Id. at 278. 
 219. Id. at 284. 
 220. Id. at 286. 
 221. Id. at 288. 
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as “a formal part of the Board’s activities.”
222
 Therefore, the Third Circuit 




3. Ninth Circuit: Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Chino 
Valley Unified School District Board of Education 
In Chino Valley, California, the public school board is tasked with 
“district administration,” which includes approving various expenses and 
disciplining students.
224
 Following an initial “closed” session, the school 
board meeting is open to the public and is “broadcast on local television.”
225
 
During the open session, the school board “sets aside time for ‘student 
recognition,’ to highlight the academic and extracurricular 
accomplishments of students in the district.”
226
 Additionally, a “student 
representative is . . . an active participant in the meetings.”
227
  
Since at least 2010, the school board “has included prayer as part of its 
meetings.”
228
 Generally, an opening prayer is given by a clergy member at 
the beginning of the open session.
229
 Under its prayer policy, the school 
board “selects clergy for each meeting” on a “first-come, first-serve, or 
other random basis.”
230
 Primarily, the opening prayer consisted of Christian 
beliefs.
231
 Moreover, the school board’s president consistently referenced 
God throughout the meetings.
232
  
Because the opening “prayers typically take place before groups of 
schoolchildren whose attendance is not truly voluntary and whose 
relationship to school district officials, including the Board, is not one of 
                                                                                                             
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 290. 
 224. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1138. 
 227. Id. at 1139. 
 228. Id.  
 229. Id. at 1138. 
 230. Id. at 1139–40. 
 231. Id. at 1140. 
 232. Id. at 1140–41 (“At another meeting, then-Board president James Na ‘urged 
everyone who does not know Jesus Christ to go and find Him.’ Na informed the assembled 
audience in May 2014, ‘God appointed us to be here—whether you to be teachers, or our 
staff members, or our principals, or our directors, assistant superintendents . . . .’ At another 
meeting, he instructed the teachers and the assembled audience: ‘anything you desire, 
depend on God.’”).  
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 the Ninth Circuit applied the Lemon test rather than the 
Marsh-Greece analysis to the prayer practice.
234
 The court described the 
school board meetings as “extensions of the educational experience of the 
district’s public schools.”
235
 Focusing on the audience of the board 
meetings, the court found that “[t]he presence of these children is integral to 
the meeting: they perform for the Board, assembled audience, and 
television viewers; they receive awards; and one among their number sits 
on the Board and participates in the Board’s deliberative process.”
236
 
Applying the Lemon analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that “the [school 
board’s] prayer policy and practice lacks a secular legislative purpose.”
237
 
Specifically, the court found that “the prayer policy’s provision for a 
solemnizing invocation does not constitute a permissible secular purpose” 
due to the prevalence of Christian prayer and broad endorsement of 
Christianity.
238
 The court stated that “[t]here is no secular reason to limit the 
solemnization to prayers or, relatedly, to have a presupposition in the policy 
that the solemnizers will be religious leaders.”
239
 Additionally, the court 
found that the prayer practice violated the second prong of the Lemon test 
because “the prayers frequently advanced religion in general and 
Christianity in particular.”
240
 Regarding the third prong, the court found that 
the prayer practice fostered “excessive government entanglement with 
religion” because “an invocation is not necessary to accomplish” the goal of 
solemnizing the meetings.
241
 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause.
242
 
B. Minority View: The Fifth Circuit 
The minority approach regarding opening prayer in public school board 
meetings allows such practices under the Marsh-Greece analysis by 
analogizing such meetings to those of legislatures.
243
 In Birdville, Texas, 
the school board is responsible for “overseeing the district’s public schools, 
                                                                                                             
 233. Id. at 1142. 
 234. Id. at 1145, 1148. 
 235. Id. at 1145. 
 236. Id. at 1146. 
 237. Id. at 1149. 
 238. Id. at 1150. 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 1151. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 1152. 
 243. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 470 (2018). 
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adopting budgets, collecting taxes, conducting elections, [and] issuing 
bonds.”
244
 The school board’s monthly meetings, which are open to the 
public, are held in an administrative building.
245
 “Most attendees are adults, 
though students frequently attend school-board meetings to receive awards 




Following the American Humanist Association’s concern with the school 
board’s policy of inviting students to lead “invocations” based on merit, the 
school board amended its policy.
247
 In 2015, the school board referred to 
the opening remarks by students as “student expressions,” provided a 
disclaimer that the students’ expressions “do not reflect” the school board’s 




In its decision to apply the Marsh-Greece framework, the Fifth Circuit 
“agree[d] with the district court that ‘a school board is more like a 
legislature than a school classroom or event.’”
249
 Specifically, the Fifth 
Circuit found that “[t]he [school board] is a deliberate body, charged 
with . . . tasks that are undeniably legislative.”
250
 The court distinguished 
Birdville’s school board from those in Coles and Indian River by 
emphasizing the lack of student members or representatives.
251
 
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit noted that “[m]ost attendees at school-board 
meetings . . . are ‘mature adults.’”
252
  
While acknowledging that “[s]chool-board prayer presumably does not 
date back to the Constitution’s adoption,” the Fifth Circuit was ultimately 
persuaded by historical evidence of opening prayer at school board 
meetings “dating from the early nineteenth century.”
253
 Furthermore, the 
court accepted the board’s argument that the prayers’ audience was the 
board members themselves, rather than the public present at meetings.
254
 
Although holding this specific practice as constitutional under the Marsh-
                                                                                                             
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 524. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 526. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 528. 
 252. Id. at 526. 
 253. Id. at 527. 
 254. Id. (“In its brief, [the school board] explains that the board members are the 
invocations’ primary audience. [The opposing parties] have not shown otherwise.”). 
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Greece analysis, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “it is possible to 




IV. Suggested Approach 
Even though the Supreme Court has upheld legislative prayer on two 
occasions, legislatures, deliberative bodies, and public school boards alike 
should not begin sessions with an opening prayer. Such practices alienate 
citizens and facilitate the tyranny of the majority, thereby diminishing 
democracy and public engagement. 
A. Problems with the “Legislative-Prayer Exception” Under Marsh-Greece 
The Supreme Court has applied the Marsh-Greece test in two settings: a 
state’s legislative sessions
256
 and a town’s board meetings.
257
 In 
Establishment Clause claims, the Marsh-Greece test remains the 
exceptional, rather than the typical, analysis utilized by lower courts.
258
 
While scholars have criticized the Marsh-Greece analysis as premised on 
an incomplete interpretation of the historical tradition of legislative 
prayer,
259
 one must seriously consider whether modern society should 
primarily rely on the founders’ practices regarding religion’s presence in 
government. Additionally, because the traditional purposes of theological 
prayer and the purposes of legislative prayer significantly differ,
260
 prayer is 
not necessary to achieve the purported goals of legislative prayer. 
                                                                                                             
 255. Id. at 529–40. 
 256. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983). 
 257. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014). 
 258. See West, supra note 6, at 711–13 (discussing Marsh as the exception to 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, applicable during a legislative prayer); see also Coles 
ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 377–81 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and referring to Marsh as a “unique tradition,” 
inapplicable in the context of a school board meeting). 
 259. See, e.g., West, supra note 6, at 712–13. 
 260. Compare Mark Batterson, What Is the Purpose of Prayer?, FAITH GATEWAY (Aug. 
10, 2018), https://www.faithgateway.com/what-is-the-purpose-of-prayer/#.Xe7hTpNKjfY 
(stating that the purpose of theological prayer is to “glorify God”), and The Purpose of 
Prayer, GRACE TO YOU (Nov. 11, 1979), https://www.gty.org/library/sermons-library/ 
2233/the-purpose-of-prayer (explaining that the purpose of theological prayer is “[n]umber 
one, to hallow the name of God; number two, to bring in his kingdom; [and] number three, 
to do his will”), with Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570 (providing that the purpose of 
legislative prayer is to “place town board members in a solemn and deliberative frame of 
mind”), and Coles, 171 F.3d at 373 (describing the goal of legislative prayer as “creat[ing] a 
‘more businesslike and professional decorum’ at the meetings”). 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court bears the duty of protecting religious 
minorities from the tyranny of the majority.
261
 By allowing potentially 




1. “Historical Tradition” 
Laurence Tribe, a Harvard constitutional law professor, classified the 
primary religious views of the founders into three categories: 
first, the evangelical view (associated primarily with Roger 
Williams) that “worldly corruptions . . . might consume the 
churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not 
maintained”; second, the Jeffersonian view that the church 
should be walled off from the state in order to safeguard secular 
interests (public and private) “against ecclesiastical depredations 
and incursions”; and, third, the Madisonian view that religious 
and secular interests alike would be advanced best by diffusing 
and decentralizing power so as to assure competition among 
sects rather than dominance by any one.
263
 
Today, however, there are not three primary sects of religion in the United 
States.
264
 Instead, the country enjoys a plurality of religion, and those 
religions are not exclusively based on Christianity.
265
 
Scholars have criticized the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
historical practice of legislative prayer as not entirely accurate.
266
 The 
founders were not in unanimous agreement that government actions should 
be premised with a prayer.
267
 While conceding that the Constitutional 
                                                                                                             
 261. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 1818). 
 262. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805–06 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[N]o American should at any point feel alienated from his government because that 
government has declared or acted upon some ‘official’ or ‘authorized’ point of view on a 
matter of religion.”). 
 263. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158–59 (2d ed. 1988) 
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).  
 264. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (“[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than 
were our forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the 
Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not 
only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no version of the 
Bible and those who worship no God at all.”). 
 265. Id. 
 266. See, e.g., West, supra note 6, at 720–26. 
 267. Id. at 709–10. 
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Convention did not begin with a prayer, the majority opinion in Marsh 
brushes this discrepancy off as a simple “oversight” because the 
Convention “thought that a mid-stream adoption of the policy would 
highlight prior omissions and because ‘[t]he Convention had no funds.’”
268
 
The lack of documented opening prayer at the Constitutional Convention, 
however, might not have been an oversight. There is record of Benjamin 
Franklin insisting “that chaplain-led prayer would guide the Framers as they 
fashioned a new system of government.”
269
  
On the other hand, “[t]he [same] Congress that passed the First 
Amendment also reenacted the Northwest Ordinance, which declared: 
‘Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government 
and happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever 
be encouraged.’”
270
 This congressional statement suggests that the founding 
generation believed religion was an indispensable element in both the 
formation and the continuation of government. Additionally, as President 
George Washington opined, “[o]f all the dispositions and habits which lead 
to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports.”
271
 
As a popular president, Washington’s statements likely represented the 
general population’s beliefs regarding the relationship between religion and 
government.  
Early state constitutions also are not particularly helpful in determining 
the founders’ intent regarding the place of religion, if any, in government. 
For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 included a clause 
guaranteeing its citizens the right to free exercise of religion.
272
 Similarly, 
in 1823, Virginia enacted a statute guaranteeing, “no man shall be 
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry 
whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened, in his 
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious 
opinions or belief.”
273
 Yet, the early Virginia legislatures typically began 
                                                                                                             
 268. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 n.6 (1983) (alteration in original). 
 269. West, supra note 6, at 710. 
 270. Matthew D. Fridy, Comment, What Wall? Government Neutrality and the Cleveland 
Voucher Program, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 709, 720–21 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
 271. George Washington, Farewell Address, 19 September 1796, NAT’L ARCHIVES: 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-20-02-0440-
0002 (last visited Apr. 20, 2021). 
 272. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II (“[N]o man ought or of right can be compelled to attend 
any religious worship . . . against, his own free will and consent: Nor can any man, who 
acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a 
citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship . . . .”). 
 273. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).  
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their sessions with opening prayer.
274
 Additionally, the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 required a religious oath for government officials: “I 
believe the Christian religion, and have a firm persuasion of its truth.”
275
  
In short, the historical evidence regarding the founders’ beliefs about 
religion’s place in government is conflicting. It is questionable whether 
their intentions can be definitively determined for two reasons. First, 
historical records from the late eighteenth century are limited. Second, and 
most importantly, the founders were a diverse group of individuals with 




Regardless of the historical controversy, the Supreme Court should 
seriously consider its excessive reliance on the founders’ beliefs and actions 
when confronted with constitutional questions regarding the relationship 
between religion and government. As Justice Brennan articulated, the 
founders should be viewed “as the authors of a document meant to last for 
the ages” rather than “sacred figures whose every actions must be 
emulated.”
277
 In a letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson discussed a 
“self-evident” principle: “‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living;’ 
that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”
278
 Since our modern 
society is composed of a plurality of religions not necessarily based on 
Christianity, relying primarily on the founders’ predominantly Christian 
religious beliefs to decide contemporary Establishment Clause cases 
becomes difficult to rationalize. 
2. Purposes of Prayer 
Theologically, the purposes of prayer are to “glorify God”
279
 or 
“[n]umber one, to hallow the name of God; number two, to bring in his 
kingdom; [and] number three, to do his will.”
280
 The purpose of legislative 
prayer, on the other hand, as articulated by the legislative bodies 
themselves, is to “place [elected officials] in a solemn and deliberative 
                                                                                                             
 274. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 n.5 (1983). 
 275. MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. 1 (amended 1821). 
 276. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 263, at 1158–59 (comparing the Jeffersonian and 
Madisonian opinions on church and state). 
 277. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 817 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 278. [Letter from] Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 6 September 1789, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-
0375-0003 (last visited Apr. 20, 2021). 
 279. Batterson, supra note 260. 
 280. The Purpose of Prayer, supra note 260. 
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 to “create a ‘more businesslike and professional 
decorum,’ at the meetings,”
282
 or to “invite[] lawmakers to reflect upon 




A pessimistic critic might accuse legislative bodies of masking their true 
purpose of legislative prayer behind a cloak of promoting seriousness. For 
example, Justice Brennan explicitly questioned the purported purposes of 
legislative prayer in his dissenting opinion in Marsh.
284
 A less pessimistic 
critic might not accuse legislators of falsely expressing their purposes 
behind legislative prayer, but instead, may question the necessity of prayer 
as the vehicle to achieve such purposes. As the Sixth Circuit noted, these 
goals can be achieved by beginning sessions with references to inspirational 
quotes that do not implicate religion whatsoever, such as passages from 
Abraham Lincoln or Martin Luther King, Jr.
285
  
3. Tyranny of the Majority 
In Federalist Paper No. 51, James Madison explained that one purpose 
of the Constitution is to prevent the tyranny of the majority.
286
  
Whilst all authority in [the federal republic of the United States] 
will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society 
itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of 
citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be 
in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.
287
 
Similarly, in Federalist Paper No. 78, Alexander Hamilton articulated that 
the court system guards against “serious oppressions of the minor party in 
the community” because judges are appointed rather than elected.
288
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has a duty to ensure that the minority voices 
are heard, especially by the legislative bodies that are elected by the 
majority.  
                                                                                                             
 281. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014). 
 282. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 283. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 583. 
 284. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 797–98 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 285. Coles, 171 F.3d at 384. 
 286. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 287. Id.  
 288. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gideon ed., 1818). 
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Today, most U.S. citizens identify with Christianity.
289
 A minority of the 
citizens either identity with non-Christian religions or do not identify with 
any religion.
290
 One study found that sixty-two percent of surveyed 
agnostics and atheists were uncomfortable when asked to pray in public, 
while only fifteen percent of surveyed Christians expected others to feel 
uncomfortable in such situations.
291
 A recent law review article recognized 
that this study “means non-religious legislators and members of the public 
may feel out of place during the [legislative] prayers.”
292
  
Moreover, “[i]n a democratically elected legislature, the religious beliefs 
of the chaplain tend to reflect the faith of the majority of the lawmakers’ 
constituents,”
293
 which, today, is Christianity.
294
 When the content of 
legislative prayer is primarily Christian, “[n]on-Christian citizens attending 
a town meeting with the hopes of addressing meaningful local issues may 
face the choice of participating in a prayer practice they do not believe in or 
offending the very government leader that they will soon be attempting to 
persuade.”
295
 In other words, the content of prayer matters because it “can 
cause citizens to feel excluded from their communities and the local 
political process.”
296
 Additionally, legislative prayer, by its very nature, 
entails government “promot[ion] [of] the idea of religion over the idea of 
nonreligion.”
297
 Therefore, Justice Brennan’s assertion that legislative 
prayer could potentially alienate citizens from their government identifies a 
genuine problem with allowing such practices.
298
  
Democracy is better served when citizens participate in democracy. 
“Citizens attend local government meetings to ‘participate in democracy’ 
and to petition the town’s elected representatives for rights and benefits.”
299
 
                                                                                                             
 289. Frank Newport, Percentage of Christians in U.S. Drifting Down, but Still High, 
GALLUP NEWS (Dec. 24, 2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/187955/percentage-christians-
drifting-down-high.aspx.  
 290. Id.  
 291. Leah Libresco, When Does Praying in Public Make Others Uncomfortable?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 16, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/when-
does-praying-in-public-make-others-uncomfortable/. 
 292. Amanda Voeller, A Leap of Faith: Questioning the Constitutionality of Texas’s 
Legislative Prayer Practice, 51 TEX. TECH L. REV. 305, 308 (2019). 
 293. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822–23 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 294. See Newport, supra note 289. 
 295. West, supra note 6, at 728. 
 296. Id. at 730. 
 297. Voeller, supra note 292, at 323. 
 298. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 805–06 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 299. West, supra note 6, at 728.  
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When citizens feel alienated from their governments, however, their 
participation in government may decrease.
300
 Democracy suffers when 
citizens do not participate because citizen participation “[e]nsure[s] that 
government actually works for the public good.”
301
 When a minority citizen 
feels alienated from his government, he may not voice his opinion, and then 
legislative bodies will make public decisions without considering all 
constituents. In addition, the legislative bodies may be making decisions 
without even realizing such decisions are not fully informed because 
minority citizens are deterred from even participating in democracy.  
Citizens whose religious preferences are expressed in legislative prayers 
also may object to the practice. As discussed above, the purposes of 
legislative prayer significantly diverge from those of traditional theological 
prayer.
302
 Justice Brennan was troubled by legislative prayer’s potential to 
generate the “trivialization and degradation of religion.”
303
 In other words, 
“[t]he dread of reducing prayer to the merely ceremonial and 




By upholding legislative prayer as constitutional, the Supreme Court 
facilitates the tyranny of the majority. Instead of acting as guardian of 
citizens’ individual rights and protector of the minority, the Court is 
ignoring citizens in their plea to prevent opening prayer in legislative 
sessions. Moreover, as Justice Brennan was concerned, the Court’s 
interpretation of legislative prayer as constitutional has created a “political 
battle[]” regarding religion’s role in governmental bodies.
305
 This feud, in 
itself, hinders productive legislative sessions because citizens, as well as 
legislators themselves, waste time, money, and resources arguing about 
opening prayers instead of considering the meaningful issues that fill a 
legislative body’s agenda.  
B. Alternatives to Legislative Prayer 
Justices and scholars have proposed various alternatives to legislative 
prayer. For example, proposals include beginning sessions with 
                                                                                                             
 300. See id. at 711–12. 
 301. See Citizen Participation, NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST., https://www.ndi.org/what-we-
do/citizen-participation (last visited Dec. 10, 2019). 
 302. See supra Part IV. 
 303. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 804. 
 304. Robert J. Delahunty, “Varied Carols”: Legislative Prayer in a Pluralist Polity, 40 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 517, 551 (2007). 
 305. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 805–06. 
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nonsectarian prayer or with readings of inspirational passages.
306
 These 
alternatives, however, do not adequately redress the concern of alienating 
citizens, thereby decreasing democratic engagement. Additionally, these 
alternatives may raise concerns of constitutionality. Instead, governmental 
bodies, including but not limited to public school boards, should begin 
sessions with a moment of silence because it adequately and inclusively 
accomplishes the goals of opening prayer. Furthermore, a moment of 
silence is unquestionably constitutional. 
1. Nonsectarian Prayer 
Rather than abolish legislative prayer altogether, Justice Kagan suggests 
requiring such prayer to be nonsectarian.
307
 In his concurring opinion in 
Town of Greece, Justice Samuel A. Alito challenged Justice Kagan’s 
suggestion of requiring legislative prayer to be nonsectarian as “daunting, if 
not impossible,” given our religiously pluralist society.
308
  
A serious problem to this proposed solution is the fact that “prayer is 
fundamentally and necessarily religious.”
309
 As one law professor stated, 
“the purported distinction between ‘sectarian’ and ‘non-sectarian’ prayer is 
illusory.”
310
 Generally, prayer entails calling upon a divine being to express 
one’s gratitude and to request its assistance. “Searching for a ‘non-
sectarian’ essence of prayer is not like stripping the husks from an ear of 
corn to find the kernels inside; it is like peeling off the layers of an onion 
until nothing is left but empty space.”
311
 Another obstacle to this proposed 
solution is the religious citizen’s objection to the trivialization of his 
religion
312
 that could occur in attempts to reduce legislative prayer to be 
devoid of religious sentiments.  
  
                                                                                                             
 306. See, e.g., Voeller, supra note 292, at 327.  
 307. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 632 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 308. Id. at 595 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Not only is there no historical support for the 
proposition that only generic prayer is allowed, but as our country has become more diverse, 
composing a prayer that is acceptable to all members of the community who hold religious 
beliefs has become harder and harder.”).  
 309. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 810.  
 310. Delahunty, supra note 304, at 522. 
 311. Id. at 539. 
 312. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 804. 
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2. Inspirational Passages 
Many judges and scholars suggest beginning legislative sessions with 
inspirational words as an alternative to legislative prayer.
313
 Allowing 
“inspirational” words while prohibiting religious words, however, might 
infringe on citizens’ and legislators’ free speech rights.
314
 Thus, this 
alternative must allow legislative bodies to begin by delivering religious 
statements not amounting to a “prayer.”
315
  
Although reciting “something like a Bible verse or words from the Pope 
would be more appropriate than a prayer,”
316
 this surrogate to legislative 
prayer still has the potential to alienate citizens. For example, if a legislative 
body predominantly began sessions with a biblical verse, the concern that 
non-Christian citizens would feel alienated still exists. Therefore, this 
alternative of removing specifically prayer while still allowing legislators to 
verbalize statements, including those of religious connotations, does not 
address the primary problem of legislative prayer. Such statements with 
religious overtones in governmental affairs can alienate minority citizens, 
thereby inhibiting a successful democracy. 
3. Moment of Silence 
Beginning sessions with a moment of silence, thereby abolishing 
opening prayer altogether, is a plausible alternative.
317
 In Wallace v. Jaffree, 
the Supreme Court considered three statutes relating to a moment of silence 
at the beginning of public school days.
318
 The first statute, which was not 
found to be unconstitutional, “authorized a 1-minute period of silence in all 
public schools ‘for meditation.’”
319
 The Court struck down the second and 
third statutes as unconstitutional,
320
 holding that they expanded on the 
moment of silence when explicitly authorizing the time “for meditation or 
                                                                                                             
 313. See, e.g., Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 384 (6th Cir. 
1999); see also Voeller, supra note 292, at 327, 329. 
 314. Voeller, supra note 292, at 329. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 323 (“Ensuring that legislative prayer practices are constitutional is such a 
subjective analysis that it would be fairer to abolish the practice, not because of any 
animosity toward religion, but because abiding by the United States Constitution—the 
foundation of our country—should be the United States legal system’s first and foremost 
goal.”). 
 318. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40–41 (1985). 
 319. Id. at 40. 
 320. Id. at 48, 61. 
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 and allowing “teachers to lead ‘willing students’ in a 
prescribed prayer to ‘Almighty God . . . the Creator and Supreme Judge of 
the world.’”
322
 Specifically, the Court found that these two statutes were 
enacted “for the sole purpose of expressing the State’s endorsement of 
prayer activities”
323
 because the statute authorizing one minute of silence 
already “protect[ed] every student’s right to engage in voluntary prayer 
during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday.”
324
 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell asserted that “some moment-of-
silence statutes may be constitutional, a suggestion set forth in the Court’s 
opinion as well.”
325
 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor, 
distinguishing “[a] state-sponsored moment of silence . . . from state-
sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading,”
326
 explained that “a moment of 
silence is not inherently religious” and a participant “need not compromise 
his or her beliefs.”
327
 According to Justice O’Connor, a moment-of-silence 
statute is constitutional as long as it “is clearly drafted and implemented so 
as to permit prayer, meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, 
without endorsing one alternative other the others.”
328
 
 Legislatures, deliberative bodies, and public school boards should 
implement a moment of silence rather than opening prayer because such a 
practice “would create the same solemnity that legislative prayer purports to 
create and may achieve this goal more inclusively than prayer does.”
329
 This 
practice would pass constitutional muster under the traditional Lemon 
analysis used in Establishment Clause claims.
330
 First, a moment of silence 
has an exclusively secular purpose of promoting seriousness to the 
beginning of legislative sessions. Second, a moment of silence neither 
advances nor inhibits religion because individuals may use the time as they 
choose, whether to “reflect on their goals for the day, meditate, or use those 
moments of peace however they feel would best benefit them.”
331
 Third, a 
moment of silence would not foster any governmental entanglement with 
religion because religion is simply not implicated.  
                                                                                                             
 321. Id. at 40. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 60. 
 324. Id. at 59. 
 325. Id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 326. Id. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 327. Id.  
 328. Id. at 76. 
 329. Voeller, supra note 292, at 327. 
 330. Id. at 328. 
 331. Id. at 327. 
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While it would be subject to strict scrutiny because no individual is given 
the right to speak during the moment of silence, the practice remains 
constitutional. The government has a compelling interest in creating an 
inclusive atmosphere for legislative sessions by mandating a moment of 
silence, rather than allowing the practice of opening prayers, to ensure 
citizens’ participation in government.
332
 Additionally, this practice would 
respect the historical tradition of legislative prayer by preserving its general 
purposes while modernizing the tradition to be more inclusive and 
respectful of our country’s diverse citizens.  
V. Conclusion  
The Supreme Court has held opening prayer at deliberative bodies as 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause. Whether the Court would 
allow opening prayer at public school boards is speculative, although 
possible, because of the Court’s heightened concern regarding religion at 
public schools. Regardless, legislatures, deliberative bodies, and public 
school boards should not continue such practices due to the risk of 
alienating citizens, which decreases democratic engagement. Additionally, 
opening prayer at public school board meetings may be indirectly coercive 
to students, who have a heightened risk of succumbing to peer pressure to 
conform. The Establishment Clause protects citizens’ right to freedom of 
religion, and opening prayer at deliberative bodies is at direct odds with this 
fundamental right.  
 
Kaitlyn M. Huelskamp 
                                                                                                             
 332. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805–06 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Establishment Clause seeks . . . that no American should at any point feel alienated 
from his government because that government has declared or acted upon some ‘official’ or 
‘authorized’ point of view on a matter of religion.”).  
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